Cryptographic Operations Validation Test Suite

CODITECT Biosciences QMS Platform

Document Control

Attribute	Value
Document ID	CRYPTO-VAL-TEST-001
Version	1.0.0
Status	Draft
Classification	Internal - Validation
Effective Date	TBD
Review Cycle	Annual or upon cryptographic system changes
Owner	Security & Compliance Team

Approval Signatures

Role	Name	Signature	Date
Prepared By	Security Engineer	_________________	________
Reviewed By	QA Manager	_________________	________
Approved By	VP Engineering	_________________	________
Approved By	Quality Assurance	_________________	________

Revision History

Version	Date	Author	Changes
1.0.0	2026-02-16	Claude (Opus 4.6)	Initial document creation

1. Executive Summary

This document defines the comprehensive validation test suite for all cryptographic operations in the CODITECT Biosciences QMS Platform. The test suite ensures compliance with:

FDA 21 CFR Part 11 (Electronic Records and Electronic Signatures)
HIPAA Security Rule (45 CFR Part 164)
SOC 2 Type II (Trust Services Criteria)
NIST FIPS 140-2/3 (Cryptographic Module Validation)
NIST SP 800-57 (Key Management Recommendations)

Purpose

Validate that all cryptographic operations meet regulatory requirements, industry standards, and performance targets through:

NIST Known Answer Tests (KAT) - Verify algorithm implementations against published test vectors
Operational Tests - Validate real-world cryptographic workflows including HSM integration
Performance Benchmarks - Ensure cryptographic operations meet latency and throughput targets
Negative Security Tests - Verify rejection of weak algorithms, tampered data, and unauthorized access

Scope

This test suite covers:

Digital Signatures: ECDSA P-256, RSA-2048
Encryption: AES-256-GCM, envelope encryption with DEK/KEK
Hashing: SHA-256, SHA-512, HMAC-SHA256
Key Management: Generation, rotation, revocation, destruction via Google Cloud KMS
PKI Operations: Certificate issuance, chain validation, revocation (CRL/OCSP)
Transport Security: TLS 1.3, mutual TLS (mTLS), certificate pinning

Success Criteria

All test cases must pass with:

NIST Vector Tests: 100% exact match with published test vectors
Operational Tests: 100% pass rate with correct outputs and error handling
Performance Tests: ≥ 95% of operations meet target latency
Security Tests: 100% rejection of weak algorithms and tampered data

2. Test Strategy Overview

2.1 Test Approach

The validation follows a four-layer testing pyramid:

                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │   Compliance    │  (Traceability to FDA/HIPAA/SOC2)
                    │   Traceability  │
                    └─────────────────┘
                   ┌───────────────────┐
                   │   Integration     │  (End-to-end workflows)
                   │   Tests           │
                   └───────────────────┘
                ┌──────────────────────────┐
                │   Operational Tests      │  (Real HSM, certificates)
                └──────────────────────────┘
            ┌────────────────────────────────────┐
            │   NIST Known Answer Tests (KAT)    │  (Algorithm correctness)
            └────────────────────────────────────┘

2.2 Test Environment Requirements

Hardware and Services

Google Cloud KMS: Production-equivalent HSM keyring for test tenant
Google Cloud Platform: GKE cluster (dev/staging environment)
Compute Resources: Minimum 4 vCPU, 16GB RAM for performance testing
Network Access: Internal VPC with Cloud KMS API access

Software Prerequisites

Node.js: v18+ (LTS)
TypeScript: v5+
Test Framework: Jest 29+ or Vitest 1+
OpenSSL: v3.0+ (for certificate operations)
Google Cloud SDK: Latest stable version

Test Data Requirements

Test Tenant: Dedicated organization test-org-crypto-validation with isolated database
Test Certificates: Self-issued root CA, intermediate CA, 10+ user certificates (valid/expired/revoked)
NIST Test Vectors: Downloaded from NIST CAVP (Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program)
Performance Baselines: Prior test run results for regression detection

Configuration

// test-config.ts
export const CRYPTO_TEST_CONFIG = {
  kms: {
    projectId: 'coditect-qms-test',
    location: 'us-central1',
    keyRingId: 'test-crypto-validation',
  },
  tenant: {
    orgId: 'test-org-crypto-validation',
    isolation: 'strict',
  },
  performance: {
    warmupIterations: 100,
    benchmarkIterations: 1000,
    concurrentUsers: [10, 50, 100],
  },
};

2.3 Test Execution Phases

Phase	Description	Test Sets	Pass Criteria
IQ	Installation Qualification	NIST KAT, HSM connectivity	100% pass
OQ	Operational Qualification	Operational tests, negative tests	100% pass
PQ	Performance Qualification	Benchmarks, load tests	≥95% meet targets

2.4 Evidence Collection

All test executions must capture:

Test Execution Report: Timestamped results with pass/fail status
Test Logs: Full console output and application logs
Performance Metrics: CSV export of latency measurements
Digital Signature: Test report signed by QA lead
Screenshots: Critical test steps (certificate validation, HSM operations)

Evidence stored in: gs://coditect-qms-validation/crypto-test-results/YYYY-MM-DD/

3. NIST Test Vector Validation

3.1 ECDSA P-256 (FIPS 186-4)

Algorithm: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm using NIST P-256 curve (secp256r1)

Reference: NIST FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4, NIST CAVP ECDSA Test Vectors

TC-NIST-ECDSA-001: Key Pair Generation Validation

Objective: Verify generated public key lies on the P-256 curve and corresponds to private key.

Test Vector (from NIST):

Private Key (d):
C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721

Expected Public Key (Qx, Qy):
Qx: 60FED4BA255A9D31C961EB74C6356D68C049B8923B61FA6CE669622E60F29FB6
Qy: 7903FE1008B8BC99A41AE9E95628BC64F2F1B20C2D7E9F5177A3C294D4462299

Procedure:

Import private key d into test HSM keyring
Retrieve public key from HSM
Verify Qx and Qy match expected values
Verify point is on curve: y² ≡ x³ + ax + b (mod p)

Expected Result: Public key matches NIST vector exactly.

TC-NIST-ECDSA-002: Signature Generation with Known Vector

Objective: Verify signature generation produces expected (r, s) values.

Test Vector (from NIST SigGen):

Message (SHA-256 hash):
44ACEF8A6E2B8B89E3D4F3D3E5F8D9B7A0C3F8A2B5E8D4F3A7E9B2C5A8E4D9F3

Private Key (d):
C9AFA9D845BA75166B5C215767B1D6934E50C3DB36E89B127B8A622B120F6721

Random k (deterministic per RFC 6979):
9E56F509196784D963D1C0A401510EE7ADA3DCC5DEE04B154BF61AF1D5A6DECE

Expected Signature:
r: F3AC8061B514795B8843E3D6629527ED2AFD6B1F6A555A7ACABB5E6F79C8C2AC
s: 8BF77819CA05A6B2786C76262BF7371CEF97B218E96F175A3CCDDA2ACC058903

Procedure:

Hash message with SHA-256
Sign hash using private key with deterministic nonce (RFC 6979)
Extract signature components (r, s)
Compare with expected values

Expected Result: Signature (r, s) matches NIST vector exactly.

TC-NIST-ECDSA-003: Signature Verification with Known Vector

Objective: Verify valid signature passes verification.

Test Vector (from TC-NIST-ECDSA-002):

Message Hash: 44ACEF8A...
Public Key (Qx, Qy): 60FED4BA..., 7903FE10...
Signature (r, s): F3AC8061..., 8BF77819...

Procedure:

Verify signature using public key
Check verification returns true

Expected Result: Signature verification succeeds.

TC-NIST-ECDSA-004: Invalid Signature Rejection

Objective: Verify tampered signatures are rejected.

Test Data: Use vector from TC-NIST-ECDSA-002 with modified s component.

Procedure:

Flip one bit in signature component s
Attempt verification
Check verification returns false

Expected Result: Verification fails with clear error message.

TC-NIST-ECDSA-005: Point-Not-On-Curve Rejection

Objective: Verify invalid public keys are rejected.

Test Data: Public key with (Qx, Qy) not satisfying curve equation.

Procedure:

Attempt to import invalid public key
Check operation fails with validation error

Expected Result: Import fails with "point not on curve" error.

3.2 AES-256-GCM (NIST SP 800-38D)

Algorithm: Advanced Encryption Standard (256-bit key) in Galois/Counter Mode

Reference: NIST SP 800-38D, NIST CAVP GCM Test Vectors

TC-NIST-AES-001: Encryption with Known Vector

Objective: Verify AES-256-GCM encryption produces expected ciphertext and authentication tag.

Test Vector (from NIST CAVP gcmEncryptExtIV256):

Key (256-bit):
92E11DCDAA866F5CE790FD24501F92509AACF4CB8B1339D50C9C1240935DD08B

IV (96-bit):
AC93A1A6145299BCE4C6A485

Plaintext (128-bit):
2D71BCF9DCB9B2A8E0D3A7F0C6F5B9E1

AAD (Additional Authenticated Data):
5C9E940FEAD2B5A05F19FCF1

Expected Ciphertext:
8A68A5FD3E87CED96F7A3F77

Expected Tag (128-bit):
D00A3A0F53EE68FCDB5D4C34A90B1656

Procedure:

Import key into HSM
Encrypt plaintext with given IV and AAD
Extract ciphertext and authentication tag
Compare with expected values

Expected Result: Ciphertext and tag match NIST vector exactly.

TC-NIST-AES-002: Decryption with Known Vector

Objective: Verify AES-256-GCM decryption recovers original plaintext.

Test Vector (from TC-NIST-AES-001):

Procedure:

Decrypt ciphertext with key, IV, AAD, and tag
Verify tag authentication succeeds
Compare decrypted plaintext with original

Expected Result: Plaintext matches original input exactly.

TC-NIST-AES-003: Authentication Tag Verification

Objective: Verify correct tag authenticates, incorrect tag rejects.

Test Data: Use vector from TC-NIST-AES-001 with flipped bit in tag.

Procedure:

Attempt decryption with tampered tag
Check operation fails with authentication error

Expected Result: Decryption fails with "authentication tag mismatch" error.

TC-NIST-AES-004: Tampered Ciphertext Detection

Objective: Verify tampered ciphertext is detected during decryption.

Test Data: Use vector from TC-NIST-AES-001 with modified ciphertext byte.

Procedure:

Flip one bit in ciphertext
Attempt decryption with original tag
Check authentication failure

Expected Result: Decryption fails with authentication error (tag computed from tampered ciphertext won't match).

TC-NIST-AES-005: IV Uniqueness Enforcement

Objective: Verify system prevents IV/nonce reuse with same key.

Test Data: Two different plaintexts, same key and IV.

Procedure:

Encrypt plaintext A with key K and IV I
Attempt to encrypt plaintext B with same key K and IV I
Check system generates new random IV or rejects operation

Expected Result: System either auto-generates unique IV or returns error "IV reuse detected".

TC-NIST-AES-006: Large Data Encryption (Streaming)

Objective: Verify correct encryption of data exceeding single-block size.

Test Vector (from NIST CAVP gcmEncryptExtIV256, 256-byte plaintext):

Key: 92E11DCD... (same as TC-NIST-AES-001)
IV: AC93A1A6...
Plaintext: [256 bytes - truncated for brevity]
Expected Ciphertext: [256 bytes]
Expected Tag: 8B3C59D2...

Procedure:

Encrypt 256-byte plaintext
Verify ciphertext and tag match expected values

Expected Result: Correct ciphertext and tag for multi-block data.

3.3 SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4)

Algorithm: Secure Hash Algorithm 256-bit

Reference: NIST FIPS 180-4, NIST CAVP SHA Test Vectors

TC-NIST-SHA-001: Empty String Hash

Objective: Verify hash of empty input.

Test Vector:

Message: "" (empty string)
Expected Hash (SHA-256):
E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855

Procedure:

Compute SHA-256 hash of empty string
Compare with expected value

Expected Result: Hash matches NIST vector exactly.

TC-NIST-SHA-002: Single-Block Message Hash

Objective: Verify hash of message ≤ 512 bits (single SHA-256 block).

Test Vector (from NIST CAVP SHA-256 ShortMsg):

Message (ASCII): "abc"
Expected Hash:
BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A396177A9CB410FF61F20015AD

Procedure:

Compute SHA-256 hash of "abc"
Compare with expected value

Expected Result: Hash matches NIST vector exactly.

TC-NIST-SHA-003: Multi-Block Message Hash

Objective: Verify hash of message requiring multiple 512-bit blocks.

Test Vector (from NIST CAVP SHA-256 LongMsg):

Message (ASCII): "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmno" (448 bits)
                 + "ijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu" (384 bits)
                 = 832 bits total (2 SHA-256 blocks)

Expected Hash:
CF5B16A778AF8380036CE59E7B0492370B249B11E8F07A51AFAC45037AFEE9D1

Procedure:

Compute SHA-256 hash of message
Compare with expected value

Expected Result: Hash matches NIST vector exactly.

TC-NIST-SHA-004: Large Message Hash (Streaming)

Objective: Verify correct hashing of 1MB message using streaming API.

Test Data: Pseudorandom 1MB message generated from NIST DRBG.

Procedure:

Generate 1MB test message with seed 0x12345678
Compute hash using streaming API (1KB chunks)
Compare with reference hash computed by OpenSSL
Verify memory usage remains constant (streaming, not buffering entire message)

Expected Result: Hash matches reference, memory usage < 10MB.

TC-NIST-SHA-005: Collision Resistance Test

Objective: Verify different inputs produce different hashes (basic collision resistance check).

Test Data: 1000 randomly generated messages.

Procedure:

Generate 1000 random messages (varying lengths 1-1024 bytes)
Compute SHA-256 hash for each
Verify all 1000 hashes are unique

Expected Result: Zero hash collisions across 1000 random inputs.

3.4 RSA-2048 (FIPS 186-4)

Algorithm: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman 2048-bit with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding

Reference: NIST FIPS 186-4 Section 5, NIST CAVP RSA Test Vectors

TC-NIST-RSA-001: Key Generation Validation

Objective: Verify generated RSA-2048 key pair meets FIPS 186-4 requirements.

Procedure:

Generate RSA-2048 key pair via HSM
Verify modulus n bit length = 2048
Verify public exponent e = 65537
Verify p and q are prime (Miller-Rabin test with 50 iterations)
Verify |p - q| > 2^(1024-100) (p and q not too close)
Verify d * e ≡ 1 (mod φ(n))

Expected Result: All validation checks pass.

TC-NIST-RSA-002: PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation

Objective: Verify RSA signature with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (legacy JWT support).

Test Vector (from NIST CAVP SigGen RSA):

Modulus n (2048-bit): [Hex value]
Private exponent d: [Hex value]
Message (SHA-256 hash): 44ACEF8A...
Expected Signature: [256 bytes]

Procedure:

Import RSA private key
Sign SHA-256 hash using PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
Compare signature with expected value

Expected Result: Signature matches NIST vector exactly.

TC-NIST-RSA-003: PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification

Objective: Verify RSA signature verification with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.

Test Vector (from TC-NIST-RSA-002):

Procedure:

Verify signature using RSA public key
Check verification returns true

Expected Result: Signature verification succeeds.

TC-NIST-RSA-004: PSS Signature Generation

Objective: Verify RSA signature with PSS padding (modern standard).

Test Vector (from NIST CAVP SigGen RSA-PSS):

Modulus n: [2048-bit]
Private exponent d: [2048-bit]
Message Hash (SHA-256): 44ACEF8A...
Salt Length: 32 bytes
Expected Signature: [256 bytes]

Procedure:

Sign hash using RSA-PSS with SHA-256 and 32-byte salt
Compare signature with expected value

Expected Result: Signature matches NIST vector exactly.

TC-NIST-RSA-005: PSS Signature Verification

Objective: Verify RSA-PSS signature verification.

Test Vector (from TC-NIST-RSA-004):

Procedure:

Verify PSS signature using public key
Check verification returns true

Expected Result: Signature verification succeeds.

TC-NIST-RSA-006: Invalid Key Rejection

Objective: Verify system rejects weak RSA keys.

Test Data: RSA-1024 key (below minimum 2048-bit requirement).

Procedure:

Attempt to import RSA-1024 private key
Check operation fails with validation error

Expected Result: Import fails with "key size below minimum 2048 bits" error.

3.5 HMAC-SHA256 (FIPS 198-1)

Algorithm: Hash-based Message Authentication Code using SHA-256

Reference: FIPS 198-1, RFC 4231 HMAC-SHA256 Test Vectors

TC-NIST-HMAC-001: Known Vector Validation (Short Key)

Objective: Verify HMAC-SHA256 with key shorter than block size.

Test Vector (from RFC 4231 Test Case 1):

Key (20 bytes):
0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B0B

Data (ASCII): "Hi There"

Expected HMAC (32 bytes):
B0344C61D8DB38535CA8AFCEAF0BF12B881DC200C9833DA726E9376C2E32CFF7

Procedure:

Compute HMAC-SHA256 using given key and data
Compare with expected value

Expected Result: HMAC matches RFC 4231 vector exactly.

TC-NIST-HMAC-002: Known Vector Validation (Long Key)

Objective: Verify HMAC-SHA256 with key longer than SHA-256 block size (64 bytes).

Test Vector (from RFC 4231 Test Case 5):

Key (131 bytes):
0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C0C... (131 times 0x0C)

Data (ASCII): "Test With Truncation"

Expected HMAC (32 bytes):
A3B6167473100EE06E0C796C2955552B

Note: Key > 64 bytes triggers key hashing per HMAC spec.

Procedure:

Compute HMAC-SHA256 with 131-byte key
Compare with expected value

Expected Result: HMAC matches RFC 4231 vector exactly.

TC-NIST-HMAC-003: Variable-Length Data

Objective: Verify HMAC correctness across different data lengths.

Test Vectors (from RFC 4231 Test Cases 2-4):

Test Case 2:
Key: "Jefe"
Data: "what do ya want for nothing?"
Expected: 5BDCC146BF60754E6A042426089575C75A003F089D2739839DEC58B964EC3843

Test Case 3:
Key: AAAA... (20 bytes)
Data: DDDD... (50 bytes)
Expected: 773EA91E36800E46854DB8EBD09181A72959098B3EF8C122D9635514CED565FE

Procedure:

Compute HMAC for each test case
Verify all match expected values

Expected Result: All HMACs match RFC 4231 vectors exactly.

TC-NIST-HMAC-004: Truncated MAC Validation

Objective: Verify truncated HMAC output (common in protocols like JWT).

Test Data: Use TC-NIST-HMAC-001 vector, truncate to 128 bits.

Procedure:

Compute full 256-bit HMAC
Truncate to first 128 bits
Verify truncated value matches first 16 bytes of expected HMAC

Expected Result: Truncated HMAC matches expected prefix.

TC-NIST-HMAC-005: Timing Attack Resistance

Objective: Verify HMAC comparison uses constant-time algorithm.

Test Data: Correct HMAC and 100 incorrect HMACs differing at various byte positions.

Procedure:

Generate correct HMAC for test message
Create 100 incorrect HMACs (flip bits at positions 0, 1, 2, ..., 31)
Measure verification time for each
Compute standard deviation of verification times
Verify stddev < 1% of mean time (indicating constant-time comparison)

Expected Result: Verification time variance < 1% (constant-time comparison confirmed).

4. Operational Test Cases

4.1 Key Management Operations

TC-KM-001: Generate ECDSA P-256 Key Pair via HSM

Objective: Verify successful creation of ECDSA signing key in Google Cloud KMS.

Procedure:

Call keyManagementService.createKey() with algorithm EC_SIGN_P256_SHA256
Verify key created with status ENABLED
Verify key purpose = ASYMMETRIC_SIGN
Retrieve public key and validate format (PEM-encoded X.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
Verify key is non-exportable (protection level = HSM)

Test Data:

{
  keyRingId: 'test-crypto-validation',
  keyId: 'test-ecdsa-p256-001',
  algorithm: 'EC_SIGN_P256_SHA256',
  protectionLevel: 'HSM',
}

Expected Result: Key created successfully, public key retrievable, protection level = HSM.

Evidence: Screenshot of Cloud KMS console showing created key, API response JSON.

TC-KM-002: Generate AES-256 Key via HSM

Objective: Verify successful creation of AES encryption key in Cloud KMS.

Procedure:

Call keyManagementService.createKey() with algorithm GOOGLE_SYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION
Verify key created with purpose = ENCRYPT_DECRYPT
Verify key version auto-created with state ENABLED
Test encrypt/decrypt operation with key

Test Data:

{
  keyRingId: 'test-crypto-validation',
  keyId: 'test-aes-256-001',
  algorithm: 'GOOGLE_SYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION',
  protectionLevel: 'HSM',
}

Expected Result: Key created successfully, encrypt/decrypt operations succeed.

Evidence: API response JSON, successful encrypt/decrypt test output.

TC-KM-003: Key Rotation

Objective: Verify key rotation creates new version and old version remains functional.

Procedure:

Create AES key with auto-rotation disabled
Encrypt test data with initial key version (v1)
Manually rotate key (create version v2)
Verify primary version updated to v2
Encrypt new data with v2
Decrypt data encrypted with v1 (verify old version still decrypts)
Decrypt data encrypted with v2

Expected Result:

Version v2 becomes primary
Data encrypted with v1 can still be decrypted
New encryptions use v2
Both versions remain in state ENABLED

Evidence: API responses showing version creation, decrypt operations with both versions.

TC-KM-004: Key Revocation

Objective: Verify revoked key version cannot perform cryptographic operations.

Procedure:

Create ECDSA key
Sign test message with key
Disable key version
Attempt to sign new message
Verify operation fails with "key version disabled" error
Verify previously created signature still verifies (revocation doesn't invalidate old signatures)

Expected Result:

Signing with disabled key version fails
Existing signatures remain valid
Error message clearly indicates key is disabled

Evidence: Error response JSON, verification of old signature success.

TC-KM-005: Key Destruction

Objective: Verify scheduled destruction prevents key usage after grace period.

Procedure:

Create test AES key
Schedule key version for destruction (24-hour grace period)
Verify key version state = DESTROY_SCHEDULED
Verify key still functional during grace period
[Manual verification after 24h] Verify key version state = DESTROYED
[Manual verification after 24h] Verify decrypt operations fail

Expected Result:

Key usable during grace period
After grace period, key version transitions to DESTROYED
Decrypt operations fail with "key version destroyed" error

Evidence: State transition logs, failed decrypt operation after destruction.

Note: Full test requires 24-hour wait. Automated test verifies scheduling; manual verification required for post-destruction state.

TC-KM-006: Key Access Control

Objective: Verify RBAC prevents unauthorized key usage.

Procedure:

Create test key with permissions: test-user@coditect-qms-test.iam.gserviceaccount.com granted cloudkms.cryptoKeyEncrypterDecrypter
Attempt to decrypt using unauthorized service account (no role granted)
Verify operation fails with permission denied error
Authenticate as authorized service account
Verify decrypt succeeds

Expected Result:

Unauthorized account receives HTTP 403 Forbidden
Error message: "Permission 'cloudkms.cryptoKeyVersions.useToDecrypt' denied"
Authorized account succeeds

Evidence: Error response for unauthorized access, success response for authorized access.

TC-KM-007: Key Export Prevention

Objective: Verify HSM keys are non-exportable.

Procedure:

Create HSM-backed key (protection level = HSM)
Attempt to export private key via Cloud KMS API
Verify operation fails (no export API exists for HSM keys)
Verify public key export succeeds (asymmetric keys only)

Expected Result:

No API method exists to export HSM private keys
Public key export returns PEM-encoded key
Documentation confirms HSM keys are non-exportable

Evidence: API documentation reference, successful public key export.

4.2 Envelope Encryption

TC-EE-001: Encrypt Data with DEK, Wrap DEK with KEK

Objective: Verify envelope encryption workflow: generate DEK, encrypt data, wrap DEK with Cloud KMS KEK.

Procedure:

Generate random 256-bit DEK (Data Encryption Key) using crypto.randomBytes(32)
Encrypt test data (1KB JSON payload) with DEK using AES-256-GCM
Store IV and authentication tag with ciphertext
Wrap DEK using Cloud KMS KEK: keyManagementService.encrypt({ plaintext: DEK })
Store wrapped DEK with encrypted data
Verify ciphertext != plaintext
Verify wrapped DEK != raw DEK

Test Data:

{
  "patient_id": "P-12345",
  "test_results": [{"assay": "ELISA", "value": 0.345}],
  "timestamp": "2026-02-16T10:30:00Z"
}

Expected Result:

Data encrypted with DEK
DEK wrapped with KEK
Output structure: { ciphertext: Buffer, iv: Buffer, authTag: Buffer, wrappedDEK: Buffer }

Evidence: Encrypted payload JSON, wrapped DEK hex dump.

TC-EE-002: Decrypt Envelope (Unwrap DEK, Decrypt Data)

Objective: Verify envelope decryption workflow: unwrap DEK, decrypt data.

Procedure:

Use encrypted data from TC-EE-001
Unwrap DEK using Cloud KMS: keyManagementService.decrypt({ ciphertext: wrappedDEK })
Decrypt data using unwrapped DEK with AES-256-GCM (IV and authTag from TC-EE-001)
Verify authentication tag
Verify decrypted plaintext matches original test data

Expected Result:

DEK successfully unwrapped
Data successfully decrypted
Plaintext matches original input byte-for-byte

Evidence: Decrypted JSON payload matching original.

TC-EE-003: KEK Rotation (Old DEKs Still Unwrappable)

Objective: Verify KEK rotation doesn't break existing wrapped DEKs.

Procedure:

Encrypt data and wrap DEK using KEK version v1 (from TC-EE-001)
Rotate KEK (create version v2, set as primary)
Unwrap DEK wrapped with v1 using rotated KEK
Verify unwrap succeeds (Cloud KMS automatically uses correct version)
Decrypt data using unwrapped DEK
Encrypt new data, wrap DEK with rotated KEK (now uses v2)
Verify new DEK unwrap succeeds

Expected Result:

Old DEKs (wrapped with v1) remain unwrappable after rotation
New wraps use v2
Decryption succeeds for both old and new envelopes

Evidence: Successful decrypt of data encrypted before and after KEK rotation.

TC-EE-004: Large Data Encryption (100MB)

Objective: Verify envelope encryption scales to large files.

Procedure:

Generate 100MB test file (random bytes)
Generate DEK and wrap with KEK
Encrypt file using AES-256-GCM in streaming mode (1MB chunks)
Measure encryption time and memory usage
Decrypt file and verify hash matches original
Verify memory usage remains constant during streaming

Expected Result:

Encryption completes in < 30 seconds
Memory usage < 50MB (streaming, not buffering entire file)
Decrypted file hash matches original

Evidence: Performance metrics (time, memory), hash comparison output.

TC-EE-005: Concurrent Encryption Operations

Objective: Verify multiple concurrent envelope encryptions don't conflict.

Procedure:

Create 10 concurrent encryption tasks (each encrypting 1MB payload)
Each task generates unique DEK, encrypts data, wraps DEK
Verify all 10 tasks complete successfully
Verify all 10 DEKs are unique
Decrypt all 10 payloads and verify correctness

Expected Result:

All 10 encryptions succeed
No DEK collisions
All 10 decryptions succeed
Total time < 5 seconds (parallelism effective)

Evidence: Concurrent task completion log, unique DEK verification.

4.3 Digital Signature Operations

TC-DS-001: Sign Document Hash with User Certificate

Objective: Verify document signing with user's ECDSA certificate.

Procedure:

Prepare test document (PDF metadata + SHA-256 hash)
Retrieve user's signing certificate and private key from HSM
Sign document hash using ECDSA P-256
Embed signature in CAdES-BES structure (ETSI TS 103 171)
Include signer certificate in signature envelope
Verify signature structure contains:
- Signed hash
- Signature value (r, s)
- Signer certificate
- Signing time timestamp

Test Data:

{
  "document_id": "DOC-2026-001",
  "document_hash": "a3b5c7...",
  "signer_id": "user-001@test-org-crypto-validation",
  "signing_time": "2026-02-16T10:30:00Z"
}

Expected Result:

Signature created successfully
CAdES-BES structure valid per ETSI specification
Signature size < 2KB

Evidence: Signed document JSON, signature structure dump.

TC-DS-002: Verify Signature with Certificate Chain

Objective: Verify signature verification validates full certificate chain (user → intermediate → root).

Procedure:

Use signed document from TC-DS-001
Extract signer certificate from signature envelope
Build certificate chain: user cert → intermediate CA cert → root CA cert
Verify root CA certificate is in trust store
Verify each certificate in chain:
- Signature valid (signed by parent CA)
- Not expired
- Not revoked (check CRL/OCSP)
- Key usage allows signing
Verify document signature using validated certificate

Expected Result:

Certificate chain validation succeeds
Signature verification succeeds
Validation result: VALID with trust chain to root CA

Evidence: Certificate chain validation log, signature verification result.

TC-DS-003: Reject Signature from Revoked Certificate

Objective: Verify signature verification fails when signer certificate is revoked.

Procedure:

Issue test certificate for user test-revoked-user@test-org
Sign test document with certificate
Revoke certificate via internal CA (add to CRL)
Publish updated CRL
Attempt to verify signature
Check CRL during verification
Verify verification fails with "certificate revoked" error

Expected Result:

Verification fails
Error message: "Certificate revoked (CRL check failed)"
Error includes revocation date and reason

Evidence: CRL entry for revoked certificate, verification error response.

TC-DS-004: Reject Signature from Expired Certificate

Objective: Verify signature verification fails when certificate is expired.

Procedure:

Create test certificate with 1-hour validity (notAfter = now + 1 hour)
Sign test document immediately
[Manual after 1 hour] Attempt to verify signature
Verify verification fails with "certificate expired" error

Expected Result:

Signature verification fails after expiry
Error message: "Certificate expired (notAfter: 2026-02-16T11:30:00Z)"

Evidence: Certificate with short validity, verification error after expiry.

Note: Automated test uses certificate with notAfter in past; manual test verifies real-time expiry behavior.

TC-DS-005: Reject Signature from Wrong Tenant Certificate

Objective: Verify cross-tenant signature rejection (tenant isolation).

Procedure:

Create document in tenant A (test-org-crypto-validation)
Attempt to sign document using certificate issued to tenant B (test-org-b)
Verify signing operation succeeds (signature cryptographically valid)
Verify document repository rejects signature due to tenant mismatch
Check error: "Signer certificate does not belong to document tenant"

Expected Result:

Signature cryptographically valid
Application-level tenant check rejects signature
Error clearly indicates tenant mismatch

Evidence: Tenant ID mismatch error, audit log entry.

TC-DS-006: Long-Term Validation (LTV) with Embedded OCSP

Objective: Verify signature includes OCSP response for long-term validation.

Procedure:

Sign document with user certificate
Query OCSP responder for signer certificate status
Embed OCSP response in signature envelope (CAdES-T format)
Include timestamp from trusted TSA (Time Stamping Authority)
Verify LTV signature structure contains:
- Signature value
- Signer certificate
- OCSP response
- Timestamp token
Verify signature remains verifiable even if OCSP responder becomes unavailable

Expected Result:

LTV signature created successfully
OCSP response embedded and valid
Signature verifiable offline (no network calls to OCSP)

Evidence: LTV signature structure dump showing embedded OCSP response.

TC-DS-007: Concurrent Signature Operations

Objective: Verify multiple concurrent signing operations don't conflict.

Procedure:

Create 10 concurrent signing tasks
Each task signs unique document with same user certificate
All tasks use HSM-backed private key (same key handle)
Verify all 10 signatures created successfully
Verify all 10 signatures verify correctly
Measure total time and throughput

Expected Result:

All 10 signatures succeed
Average signing time < 50ms (meets performance target from TRACK-D)
Throughput ≥ 200 signatures/second (10 signatures in < 50ms total)

Evidence: Concurrent task completion log, performance metrics.

4.4 Certificate Operations

TC-CO-001: Issue User Signing Certificate

Objective: Verify user certificate issuance via internal CA.

Procedure:

Generate ECDSA P-256 key pair for user (CSR private key)
Create Certificate Signing Request (CSR):
- Subject: CN=test-user-001, O=test-org-crypto-validation, C=US
- Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non-Repudiation
- Extended Key Usage: Document Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.36)
Submit CSR to internal intermediate CA
Verify CA validates CSR signature
Verify CA issues certificate signed by intermediate CA
Verify issued certificate:
- Serial number unique
- Validity period = 1 year
- Issuer = intermediate CA DN
- Subject matches CSR
- Public key matches CSR
- Extensions correct (Key Usage, EKU)

Expected Result:

Certificate issued successfully
Certificate format: X.509 v3 PEM-encoded
All extensions and fields correct

Evidence: Issued certificate PEM file, OpenSSL certificate dump output.

TC-CO-002: Verify Certificate Chain

Objective: Verify complete certificate chain validation (user → intermediate → root).

Procedure:

Use certificate from TC-CO-001

Build certificate chain:

Root CA (self-signed)
  └─ Intermediate CA (signed by Root)
      └─ User Certificate (signed by Intermediate)

Verify using OpenSSL: openssl verify -CAfile root.pem -untrusted intermediate.pem user.pem
Verify programmatic validation using Node.js crypto.createVerify()
Check each link:
- User cert signature valid (verify with Intermediate CA public key)
- Intermediate cert signature valid (verify with Root CA public key)
- Root CA self-signature valid

Expected Result:

OpenSSL verify: user.pem: OK
Programmatic verification succeeds
Trust chain established to root CA

Evidence: OpenSSL verify output, validation logs.

TC-CO-003: Revoke Certificate and Verify CRL Update

Objective: Verify certificate revocation updates CRL.

Procedure:

Issue test certificate (from TC-CO-001)
Revoke certificate via CA admin interface:
- Revocation reason: keyCompromise
- Revocation date: current timestamp
Trigger CRL regeneration (CA should auto-regenerate or manual trigger)
Download CRL from distribution point (HTTP URL)
Parse CRL and verify:
- Revoked certificate serial number present
- Revocation date correct
- Revocation reason extension present
Verify CRL signature valid (signed by intermediate CA)

Expected Result:

Certificate appears in CRL within 5 minutes of revocation
CRL entry contains serial number, revocation date, reason
CRL signature valid

Evidence: CRL file, OpenSSL CRL dump showing revoked certificate entry.

TC-CO-004: OCSP Response for Valid Certificate

Objective: Verify OCSP responder returns "good" status for valid certificate.

Procedure:

Use valid certificate from TC-CO-001
Construct OCSP request:
- Certificate serial number
- Issuer name hash
- Issuer key hash
Send OCSP request to responder URL (from certificate AIA extension)
Verify OCSP response:
- Status: good
- Response signature valid (signed by OCSP responder certificate)
- Responder certificate issued by same CA
- thisUpdate and nextUpdate timestamps valid

Expected Result:

OCSP response status: good
Response received within 2 seconds
Response signature valid

Evidence: OCSP response ASN.1 dump, status verification log.

TC-CO-005: OCSP Response for Revoked Certificate

Objective: Verify OCSP responder returns "revoked" status for revoked certificate.

Procedure:

Use revoked certificate from TC-CO-003
Construct and send OCSP request
Verify OCSP response:
- Status: revoked
- Revocation time present
- Revocation reason present (keyCompromise)

Expected Result:

OCSP response status: revoked
Response includes revocation time and reason
Response received within 2 seconds

Evidence: OCSP response ASN.1 dump showing revoked status.

TC-CO-006: Certificate Renewal Before Expiry

Objective: Verify seamless certificate renewal before expiration.

Procedure:

Use certificate issued in TC-CO-001 (expiry = now + 1 year)
Simulate renewal 30 days before expiry (change system clock or create cert with near-expiry date)
Generate new CSR with same subject DN but new key pair
Submit renewal request to CA
Verify CA issues new certificate:
- New serial number
- New validity period (1 year from renewal date)
- Same subject DN
- New public key
Verify old certificate remains valid until expiry (both certs valid during overlap period)

Expected Result:

New certificate issued with fresh validity period
Old certificate not revoked (graceful transition)
Both certificates valid during overlap

Evidence: Old and new certificates with overlapping validity periods.

TC-CO-007: Cross-Tenant Certificate Rejection

Objective: Verify certificate issued to tenant A cannot be used in tenant B.

Procedure:

Issue certificate to user-a@tenant-a
Create document in tenant B
Attempt to sign document using tenant A certificate
Verify application-level check rejects operation
Check error: "Certificate organization (tenant-a) does not match document tenant (tenant-b)"

Expected Result:

Signing operation rejected
Clear tenant mismatch error
Audit log entry created

Evidence: Tenant mismatch error response, audit log entry.

4.5 TLS Operations

TC-TLS-001: TLS 1.3 Handshake with Approved Cipher Suites

Objective: Verify TLS 1.3 connection uses approved cipher suites only.

Procedure:

Configure test client to connect to QMS platform API endpoint
Capture TLS handshake with openssl s_client or Wireshark
Verify:
- TLS version negotiated = 1.3
- Cipher suite = one of:
  - TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  - TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
  - TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- Key exchange = ECDHE (ephemeral keys)
- Certificate signature algorithm = ECDSA-P256-SHA256 or RSA-PSS-SHA256
Verify forward secrecy enabled (ephemeral DH keys)

Test Command:

openssl s_client -connect api.coditect-qms-test.com:443 -tls1_3 -showcerts

Expected Result:

TLS 1.3 negotiation succeeds
Approved cipher suite used
Server certificate valid
Forward secrecy confirmed

Evidence: OpenSSL handshake output, Wireshark capture showing TLS 1.3.

TC-TLS-002: Reject TLS 1.2 and Below

Objective: Verify server rejects TLS 1.2, 1.1, 1.0 connections.

Procedure:

Attempt connection with TLS 1.2: openssl s_client -connect api.coditect-qms-test.com:443 -tls1_2
Verify connection refused or handshake fails
Attempt connection with TLS 1.1: openssl s_client -tls1_1
Attempt connection with TLS 1.0: openssl s_client -tls1
Verify all legacy TLS versions rejected

Expected Result:

TLS 1.2 connection fails with "protocol version not supported"
TLS 1.1 connection fails
TLS 1.0 connection fails
Only TLS 1.3 accepted

Evidence: OpenSSL error messages showing protocol rejection.

TC-TLS-003: Mutual TLS (mTLS) with Service Certificates

Objective: Verify mutual TLS authentication between microservices.

Procedure:

Configure test service A with client certificate
Configure test service B to require client certificates
Establish mTLS connection from A to B
Verify:
- Server (B) presents certificate to client (A)
- Client (A) presents certificate to server (B)
- Both certificates validated against trusted CA
- Connection established only if both certs valid
Attempt connection without client certificate
Verify connection refused

Expected Result:

mTLS connection succeeds with valid client cert
Connection fails without client cert (error: "certificate required")
Both client and server certificates validated

Evidence: mTLS handshake logs showing client certificate verification.

TC-TLS-004: Certificate Pinning Validation

Objective: Verify client enforces certificate pinning for API connections.

Procedure:

Configure test client with pinned certificate fingerprint (SHA-256 hash of server cert public key)
Connect to API server
Verify client validates:
- Server certificate chain
- Pinned fingerprint matches server cert public key hash
Simulate attack: serve different valid certificate (signed by same CA)
Verify client rejects connection (fingerprint mismatch)

Test Data:

const pinnedFingerprint = 'A7:3D:5F:...'; // SHA-256 hash of legitimate server cert public key

Expected Result:

Connection succeeds with pinned certificate
Connection fails with different certificate (even if CA-signed)
Error: "Certificate fingerprint mismatch"

Evidence: Successful connection log, fingerprint mismatch error for different cert.

TC-TLS-005: Reject Self-Signed Certificates

Objective: Verify client rejects self-signed certificates in production mode.

Procedure:

Generate self-signed certificate for test server
Configure test server with self-signed cert
Attempt client connection with production settings (verify=true)
Verify connection fails with "self-signed certificate" error
[Dev mode test] Enable rejectUnauthorized=false and verify connection succeeds (confirm dev override works)

Expected Result:

Production mode: connection fails, error "self-signed certificate in certificate chain"
Dev mode: connection succeeds (override working as expected)

Evidence: Production mode error, dev mode success (confirming flag functionality).

5. Negative / Security Test Cases

TC-NEG-001: Reject MD5 Hash

Objective: Verify system rejects MD5 hash algorithm (broken, not FIPS-approved).

Procedure:

Attempt to compute MD5 hash via crypto library
Verify operation fails or returns error
Attempt to verify signature with MD5 hash
Verify verification fails

Expected Result:

MD5 hash function disabled or returns error
Error message: "MD5 algorithm not allowed (insecure)"

Evidence: Error response from hash function.

TC-NEG-002: Reject SHA-1 Signature

Objective: Verify system rejects SHA-1 signatures (collision attacks demonstrated).

Procedure:

Create test certificate with signature algorithm SHA1withRSA
Attempt to import certificate into trust store
Verify import fails or certificate marked untrusted
Attempt to verify document signature using SHA-1 hash
Verify verification fails

Expected Result:

Certificate import fails: "SHA-1 signatures not accepted"
Signature verification fails: "SHA-1 hash algorithm not allowed"

Evidence: Import error message, signature verification failure.

TC-NEG-003: Reject DES/3DES Encryption

Objective: Verify system rejects legacy DES and 3DES encryption.

Procedure:

Attempt to create symmetric key with algorithm DES or 3DES
Verify operation fails
Attempt to decrypt ciphertext encrypted with 3DES
Verify decryption fails

Expected Result:

Key creation fails: "DES/3DES algorithms not allowed"
Decryption fails: "Algorithm not supported"

Evidence: Key creation error, decryption error.

TC-NEG-004: Reject RSA < 2048 Bits

Objective: Verify system rejects weak RSA keys below 2048-bit minimum.

Procedure:

Generate RSA-1024 key pair outside system
Attempt to import RSA-1024 private key into HSM
Verify import fails
Attempt to import certificate with RSA-1024 public key
Verify import fails

Expected Result:

Key import fails: "RSA key size below minimum 2048 bits"
Certificate import fails: "Weak RSA key (1024 bits)"

Evidence: Import error messages.

TC-NEG-005: Reject Expired Certificates

Objective: Verify certificate validation fails for expired certificates.

Procedure:

Create test certificate with notAfter = 1 day ago
Attempt to use certificate for signing
Verify operation fails
Attempt to verify signature with expired certificate
Verify verification fails

Expected Result:

Signing fails: "Certificate expired"
Verification fails: "Certificate expired (notAfter: 2026-02-15T00:00:00Z)"

Evidence: Expired certificate validation errors.

TC-NEG-006: Detect Tampered Ciphertext (GCM Auth Tag Failure)

Objective: Verify AES-GCM detects ciphertext tampering via authentication tag.

Procedure:

Encrypt test data with AES-256-GCM (from TC-EE-001)
Flip one bit in ciphertext (e.g., byte 10, bit 3)
Attempt decryption with original IV and auth tag
Verify decryption fails with authentication error
Verify no plaintext returned (fail-fast on auth failure)

Expected Result:

Decryption fails immediately after auth tag verification
Error: "Authentication tag mismatch (ciphertext tampered)"
No plaintext leaked before authentication

Evidence: Authentication failure error, verification that plaintext not returned.

TC-NEG-007: Detect Tampered Signature

Objective: Verify signature verification detects tampered signature values.

Procedure:

Create valid signature (from TC-DS-001)
Flip one bit in signature value (modify r or s component)
Attempt signature verification
Verify verification fails

Expected Result:

Verification fails: "Signature verification failed"
No false positive acceptance

Evidence: Signature verification failure log.

TC-NEG-008: Reject Null/Empty Encryption Key

Objective: Verify system rejects null or empty encryption keys.

Procedure:

Attempt to encrypt data with null key: key = null
Attempt to encrypt data with empty buffer: key = Buffer.alloc(0)
Attempt to encrypt data with key of incorrect size: key = Buffer.alloc(16) (128-bit instead of 256-bit)
Verify all operations fail with validation error

Expected Result:

Null key: "Encryption key is null or undefined"
Empty key: "Encryption key length invalid (expected 32 bytes, got 0)"
Wrong size: "Encryption key length invalid (expected 32 bytes, got 16)"

Evidence: Validation error messages.

TC-NEG-009: Reject Reused AES-GCM Nonce

Objective: Verify system prevents catastrophic AES-GCM nonce reuse.

Procedure:

Encrypt data A with key K and IV I1
Encrypt data B with same key K and same IV I1
Verify system either:
- Auto-generates new random IV for second encryption (preferred), OR
- Rejects second encryption with error "IV reuse detected"
Verify application tracks used IVs per key (nonce reuse detection)

Expected Result:

System auto-generates unique IV for each encryption, OR
System rejects reuse with error "IV/nonce reuse with same key not allowed"

Evidence: Encryption logs showing unique IVs, or IV reuse rejection error.

Note: IV reuse with AES-GCM completely breaks confidentiality. System must prevent this.

TC-NEG-010: Timing Attack Resistance (Constant-Time Comparison)

Objective: Verify cryptographic comparisons use constant-time algorithms (timing attack mitigation).

Procedure:

Prepare correct HMAC value
Prepare 1000 incorrect HMAC values with differences at each byte position (0-31)
Measure verification time for each of 1000 comparisons
Compute mean and standard deviation of verification times
Verify standard deviation < 1% of mean time (confirms constant-time comparison)
Repeat test 10 times to confirm consistency

Test Setup:

const correctHMAC = Buffer.from('A3B5C7D9...', 'hex');
const incorrectHMACs = generateIncorrectHMACs(correctHMAC, 1000);
const times = incorrectHMACs.map(hmac => measureVerificationTime(hmac, correctHMAC));
const stddev = calculateStdDev(times);
const mean = calculateMean(times);
assert(stddev / mean < 0.01, 'Timing variance exceeds 1% - potential timing leak');

Expected Result:

Verification time variance < 1% (constant-time confirmed)
No correlation between byte position of difference and verification time

Evidence: Timing analysis data, statistical analysis output.

6. Performance Benchmark Suite

6.1 Performance Targets

Operation	Target Latency (p95)	Target Throughput
ECDSA P-256 Sign	< 50ms	≥ 20 ops/sec
ECDSA P-256 Verify	< 30ms	≥ 30 ops/sec
AES-256-GCM Encrypt (1KB)	< 5ms	≥ 200 ops/sec
AES-256-GCM Decrypt (1KB)	< 5ms	≥ 200 ops/sec
SHA-256 Hash (1KB)	< 1ms	≥ 1000 ops/sec
HSM Key Sign	< 100ms	≥ 10 ops/sec
Certificate Chain Validation	< 200ms	≥ 5 ops/sec

6.2 Benchmark Test Cases

TC-PERF-001: ECDSA P-256 Sign Latency

Objective: Measure ECDSA signature generation latency distribution.

Procedure:

Prepare 1000 unique test messages (1KB each)
Load ECDSA P-256 private key from HSM
Warm-up: Sign 100 messages (exclude from measurements)
Benchmark: Sign 1000 messages, record latency for each
Compute percentiles: p50, p90, p95, p99, max
Verify p95 < 50ms (target)

Test Code:

const messages = generateTestMessages(1000, 1024);
const privateKey = await loadHSMKey('test-ecdsa-p256-001');

// Warm-up
for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
  await signMessage(messages[i], privateKey);
}

// Benchmark
const latencies: number[] = [];
for (const message of messages) {
  const start = performance.now();
  await signMessage(message, privateKey);
  const end = performance.now();
  latencies.push(end - start);
}

const stats = calculatePercentiles(latencies);
console.log(`p50: ${stats.p50}ms, p95: ${stats.p95}ms, p99: ${stats.p99}ms`);
assert(stats.p95 < 50, `ECDSA sign p95 latency ${stats.p95}ms exceeds target 50ms`);

Expected Result:

p50 < 30ms
p95 < 50ms
p99 < 80ms

Evidence: Latency distribution histogram, percentile table.

TC-PERF-002: ECDSA P-256 Verify Latency

Objective: Measure ECDSA signature verification latency.

Procedure:

Pre-generate 1000 signed messages (from TC-PERF-001)
Load ECDSA P-256 public key
Warm-up: Verify 100 signatures
Benchmark: Verify 1000 signatures, record latency for each
Compute percentiles
Verify p95 < 30ms

Expected Result:

p50 < 15ms
p95 < 30ms
p99 < 50ms

Evidence: Latency distribution histogram.

TC-PERF-003: AES-256-GCM Encrypt Latency (Variable Data Size)

Objective: Measure AES-256-GCM encryption latency for different data sizes.

Test Data Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB

Procedure:

For each data size:
- Generate test data
- Generate random DEK
- Warm-up: Encrypt 10 times
- Benchmark: Encrypt 100 times, record latency
- Compute p50, p95, p99
Verify 1KB p95 < 5ms

Expected Results:

Data Size	p50 Latency	p95 Latency	p99 Latency
1KB	< 1ms	< 5ms	< 10ms
10KB	< 5ms	< 10ms	< 20ms
100KB	< 20ms	< 50ms	< 80ms
1MB	< 100ms	< 200ms	< 300ms
10MB	< 800ms	< 1500ms	< 2000ms
100MB	< 8s	< 15s	< 20s

Evidence: Latency vs. data size chart, percentile table.

TC-PERF-004: AES-256-GCM Decrypt Latency

Objective: Measure AES-256-GCM decryption latency (same data sizes as TC-PERF-003).

Procedure: Same as TC-PERF-003 but decrypt instead of encrypt.

Expected Results: Similar to encryption (decryption typically same speed or slightly faster).

Evidence: Latency vs. data size chart.

TC-PERF-005: SHA-256 Hash Latency

Objective: Measure SHA-256 hashing latency for different data sizes.

Test Data Sizes: 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 100MB

Procedure:

For each data size:
- Generate test data
- Warm-up: Hash 10 times
- Benchmark: Hash 1000 times, record latency
- Compute percentiles
Verify 1KB p95 < 1ms

Expected Results:

Data Size	p50 Latency	p95 Latency	p99 Latency
1KB	< 0.5ms	< 1ms	< 2ms
10KB	< 2ms	< 5ms	< 10ms
100KB	< 15ms	< 30ms	< 50ms
1MB	< 100ms	< 200ms	< 300ms
10MB	< 1s	< 2s	< 3s
100MB	< 10s	< 15s	< 20s

Evidence: Latency vs. data size chart.

TC-PERF-006: HSM Key Sign Operation Latency

Objective: Measure end-to-end HSM signing latency (includes network round-trip to Cloud KMS).

Procedure:

Prepare 1000 test messages
Warm-up: Sign 50 messages via HSM
Benchmark: Sign 1000 messages, record latency
Compute percentiles
Verify p95 < 100ms

Expected Result:

p50 < 50ms
p95 < 100ms
p99 < 200ms

Note: HSM operations include network latency to Google Cloud KMS. Higher latency than local crypto.

Evidence: Latency distribution, comparison with local signing latency.

TC-PERF-007: Certificate Chain Validation Latency

Objective: Measure certificate chain validation latency (user → intermediate → root).

Procedure:

Prepare 100 user certificates (unique, all valid)
Build certificate chains for each
Warm-up: Validate 20 chains
Benchmark: Validate 100 chains, record latency
Compute percentiles
Verify p95 < 200ms

Expected Result:

p50 < 100ms
p95 < 200ms
p99 < 300ms

Evidence: Latency distribution.

TC-PERF-008: Concurrent Signing Throughput

Objective: Measure signature throughput under concurrent load.

Concurrency Levels: 10, 50, 100 concurrent signing operations

Procedure:

For each concurrency level:
- Spawn N concurrent tasks (each signs 100 messages)
- Measure total time to complete all tasks
- Compute throughput: (N * 100) / total_time
- Measure individual operation latency (p50, p95)
Verify throughput scales linearly up to 50 concurrent

Expected Results:

Concurrency	Throughput (ops/sec)	p50 Latency	p95 Latency
10	≥ 200	< 50ms	< 80ms
50	≥ 500	< 100ms	< 150ms
100	≥ 700	< 150ms	< 250ms

Evidence: Throughput vs. concurrency chart, latency distribution at each level.

TC-PERF-009: Envelope Encrypt/Decrypt Latency

Objective: Measure end-to-end envelope encryption latency (DEK generation + data encrypt + DEK wrap).

Test Data: 1KB payload

Procedure:

Benchmark envelope encryption (1000 iterations):
- Generate random DEK (32 bytes)
- Encrypt data with DEK (AES-256-GCM)
- Wrap DEK with HSM KEK
- Record total latency
Benchmark envelope decryption (1000 iterations):
- Unwrap DEK with HSM KEK
- Decrypt data with DEK
- Record total latency
Compute percentiles for each operation

Expected Results:

Operation	p50 Latency	p95 Latency	p99 Latency
Envelope Encrypt	< 60ms	< 120ms	< 200ms
Envelope Decrypt	< 60ms	< 120ms	< 200ms

Note: Latency dominated by HSM wrap/unwrap operations (~50ms each).

Evidence: Latency breakdown (DEK gen, encrypt, wrap times), percentile table.

6.3 Performance Benchmark Results Template

Test Execution Date: _______________ Test Environment: _______________ HSM Region: _______________ GKE Cluster: _______________ Node Type: _______________

Test Case	Operation	Data Size	Iterations	Target (p95)
TC-PERF-001	ECDSA Sign	1KB	1000	< 50ms
TC-PERF-002	ECDSA Verify	1KB	1000	< 30ms
TC-PERF-003	AES Encrypt	1KB	1000	< 5ms
TC-PERF-003	AES Encrypt	1MB	100	< 200ms
TC-PERF-003	AES Encrypt	100MB	10	< 15s
TC-PERF-004	AES Decrypt	1KB	1000	< 5ms
TC-PERF-004	AES Decrypt	1MB	100	< 200ms
TC-PERF-005	SHA-256 Hash	1KB	1000	< 1ms
TC-PERF-005	SHA-256 Hash	1MB	1000	< 200ms
TC-PERF-006	HSM Sign	1KB	1000	< 100ms
TC-PERF-007	Cert Chain Validation	N/A	100	< 200ms
TC-PERF-008	Concurrent Sign (10)	1KB	1000	< 80ms
TC-PERF-008	Concurrent Sign (50)	1KB	5000	< 150ms
TC-PERF-008	Concurrent Sign (100)	1KB	10000	< 250ms
TC-PERF-009	Envelope Encrypt	1KB	1000	< 120ms
TC-PERF-009	Envelope Decrypt	1KB	1000	< 120ms

Summary:

Total Tests: 15
Passed: _______
Failed: _______
Pass Rate: _______

Regressions Detected: (List any performance regressions compared to baseline)

Signatures:

Tested By: _________________ Date: _______
Reviewed By: _________________ Date: _______

7. Compliance Traceability Matrix

Regulatory Requirement	Description	Test Case(s)	Expected Evidence
FDA 21 CFR §11.10(a)	Validation of systems	All NIST KAT tests	Test execution report with 100% pass
FDA 21 CFR §11.10(c)	Integrity checks	TC-DS-001, TC-DS-002, TC-NEG-006, TC-NEG-007	Valid signatures, tamper detection logs
FDA 21 CFR §11.50(a)(1)	Signed records contain identity	TC-DS-001, TC-CO-001	Signature envelope with signer certificate
FDA 21 CFR §11.50(a)(2)	Signed records contain date/time	TC-DS-001	Signature envelope with trusted timestamp
FDA 21 CFR §11.50(b)	Signature uniquely linked to record	TC-DS-002, TC-DS-005	Signature verification, tenant isolation
FDA 21 CFR §11.70	Signature/record linking	TC-DS-001, TC-DS-002	Document hash in signature, chain validation
FDA 21 CFR §11.300	Non-repudiation controls	TC-DS-006	LTV signatures with embedded OCSP
HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv)	Encryption at rest	TC-EE-001, TC-EE-002, TC-NIST-AES-001	Encrypted data, envelope encryption workflow
HIPAA §164.312(e)(1)	Encryption in transit	TC-TLS-001, TC-TLS-002, TC-TLS-003	TLS 1.3 handshake, mTLS validation
HIPAA §164.312(c)(1)	Integrity controls	TC-NEG-006, TC-NEG-007	GCM auth tag verification, signature tampering detection
SOC 2 CC6.1	Logical access controls	TC-KM-006, TC-CO-007	RBAC enforcement, cross-tenant rejection
SOC 2 CC6.6	Encryption for confidentiality	TC-NIST-AES-001, TC-EE-001	AES-256-GCM encryption, HSM key protection
SOC 2 CC6.7	Encryption key management	TC-KM-001 to TC-KM-007	Key lifecycle operations, HSM non-exportability
NIST FIPS 140-2	Cryptographic module validation	All NIST KAT tests	100% match with NIST test vectors
NIST SP 800-57	Key management practices	TC-KM-003, TC-KM-004, TC-KM-005	Key rotation, revocation, destruction
NIST SP 800-52	TLS guidelines	TC-TLS-001, TC-TLS-002	TLS 1.3 only, approved cipher suites
NIST SP 800-63B	Digital authentication	TC-CO-002, TC-CO-004	Certificate chain validation, OCSP

8. Test Environment Setup

8.1 Prerequisites Checklist

8.2 Environment Configuration

Create test-env.json:

{
  "gcp": {
    "projectId": "coditect-qms-test",
    "region": "us-central1",
    "kms": {
      "keyRingId": "test-crypto-validation",
      "location": "us-central1"
    }
  },
  "tenant": {
    "orgId": "test-org-crypto-validation",
    "isolation": "strict"
  },
  "pki": {
    "rootCA": "./test-data/pki/root-ca.pem",
    "intermediateCA": "./test-data/pki/intermediate-ca.pem",
    "crlUrl": "http://crl.coditect-qms-test.com/intermediate.crl",
    "ocspUrl": "http://ocsp.coditect-qms-test.com"
  },
  "performance": {
    "warmupIterations": 100,
    "benchmarkIterations": 1000,
    "timeoutMs": 30000
  }
}

8.3 Test Data Preparation

# Create test data directory structure
mkdir -p test-data/{nist-vectors,pki,performance}

# Download NIST test vectors
curl -o test-data/nist-vectors/ecdsa-p256.zip \
  https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/dss/186-3ecdsatestvectors.zip
unzip test-data/nist-vectors/ecdsa-p256.zip -d test-data/nist-vectors/

curl -o test-data/nist-vectors/aes-gcm.zip \
  https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/mac/gcmtestvectors.zip
unzip test-data/nist-vectors/aes-gcm.zip -d test-data/nist-vectors/

# Generate test PKI
cd test-data/pki
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout root-ca-key.pem -out root-ca.pem \
  -days 3650 -nodes -subj "/CN=Test Root CA/O=CODITECT Test/C=US"

openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout intermediate-ca-key.pem -out intermediate-ca.csr \
  -nodes -subj "/CN=Test Intermediate CA/O=CODITECT Test/C=US"

openssl x509 -req -in intermediate-ca.csr -CA root-ca.pem -CAkey root-ca-key.pem \
  -CAcreateserial -out intermediate-ca.pem -days 1825 \
  -extfile <(echo "basicConstraints=CA:TRUE,pathlen:0\nkeyUsage=keyCertSign,cRLSign")

8.4 Cleanup Procedures

# Delete test keys from Cloud KMS (after test execution)
gcloud kms keys list --keyring=test-crypto-validation --location=us-central1 \
  --format="value(name)" | while read key; do
  # Schedule all versions for destruction
  gcloud kms keys versions list --key="$key" --location=us-central1 \
    --format="value(name)" | while read version; do
    gcloud kms keys versions destroy "$version" --location=us-central1
  done
done

# Drop test tenant data from database
psql -h localhost -U postgres -d coditect_qms_test -c \
  "DELETE FROM documents WHERE tenant_id = 'test-org-crypto-validation';"

# Remove test data files
rm -rf test-data/performance/*.json
rm -rf test-data/evidence/*

8.5 CI/CD Integration

GitHub Actions Workflow (.github/workflows/crypto-validation.yml):

name: Cryptographic Validation Tests

on:
  pull_request:
    paths:
      - 'src/crypto/**'
      - 'src/pki/**'
  schedule:
    - cron: '0 2 * * *'  # Nightly at 2 AM UTC

jobs:
  nist-kat-tests:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
      - uses: actions/setup-node@v3
        with:
          node-version: '18'
      - run: npm ci
      - name: Run NIST KAT Tests
        run: npm test -- --testPathPattern=nist-kat
        env:
          TEST_ENV: ci
      - name: Upload Test Results
        if: always()
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
        with:
          name: nist-kat-results
          path: test-results/nist-kat/

  operational-tests:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    needs: nist-kat-tests
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
      - uses: google-github-actions/auth@v1
        with:
          credentials_json: ${{ secrets.GCP_TEST_SA_KEY }}
      - uses: actions/setup-node@v3
        with:
          node-version: '18'
      - run: npm ci
      - name: Run Operational Tests
        run: npm test -- --testPathPattern=operational
        env:
          TEST_ENV: ci
          GCP_PROJECT: coditect-qms-test

  performance-tests:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    if: github.event_name == 'schedule'  # Only nightly
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
      - uses: google-github-actions/auth@v1
        with:
          credentials_json: ${{ secrets.GCP_TEST_SA_KEY }}
      - uses: actions/setup-node@v3
        with:
          node-version: '18'
      - run: npm ci
      - name: Run Performance Benchmarks
        run: npm test -- --testPathPattern=performance
        env:
          TEST_ENV: ci
      - name: Compare with Baseline
        run: node scripts/compare-performance-baseline.js
      - name: Upload Performance Results
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
        with:
          name: performance-results
          path: test-results/performance/

Which Tests Run When:

Event	Test Set	Duration	Blocking
Every PR	NIST KAT + Unit Tests	~5 min	Yes (must pass)
Crypto Code PR	NIST KAT + Operational	~15 min	Yes
Nightly	Full Suite (NIST + Operational + Performance)	~45 min	No (report only)
Pre-Release	Full Suite + Manual IQ/OQ/PQ	~2 hours	Yes

9. Test Execution Procedures

9.1 Installation Qualification (IQ) Test Set

Objective: Verify cryptographic system components are correctly installed and configured.

Test Set:

All NIST KAT tests (TC-NIST-*)
TC-KM-001: HSM key generation
TC-TLS-001: TLS 1.3 connectivity
TC-CO-001: Certificate issuance

Pass Criteria: 100% pass rate, all NIST vectors match exactly.

Evidence Required:

Test execution report with timestamps
NIST vector comparison results
HSM connectivity verification

Frequency: After initial installation, after system updates, after HSM configuration changes.

9.2 Operational Qualification (OQ) Test Set

Objective: Verify cryptographic operations function correctly in operational scenarios.

Test Set:

All operational tests (TC-KM-*, TC-EE-*, TC-DS-*, TC-CO-*, TC-TLS-*)
All negative security tests (TC-NEG-*)

Pass Criteria: 100% pass rate, all error conditions handled correctly.

Evidence Required:

Test execution report
Sample signed documents
Certificate chain validation logs
HSM operation logs
Security test results (rejected weak algorithms)

Frequency: After initial installation, quarterly, after major system updates.

9.3 Performance Qualification (PQ) Test Set

Objective: Verify cryptographic operations meet performance targets under load.

Test Set:

All performance benchmarks (TC-PERF-*)

Pass Criteria: ≥95% of operations meet target latency (p95).

Evidence Required:

Performance benchmark report (percentile table)
Latency distribution histograms
Throughput vs. concurrency charts
Comparison with baseline (regression check)

Frequency: After initial installation, semi-annually, after infrastructure changes (HSM region move, GKE cluster upgrade).

9.4 Re-validation Triggers

Re-run appropriate test sets when:

Change	Test Set Required	Rationale
System software update (Node.js, crypto libraries)	IQ (NIST KAT)	Verify algorithm implementations unchanged
HSM configuration change (key rotation policy, new keyring)	IQ + OQ (key management)	Verify HSM operations correct
Certificate infrastructure change (new CA, CRL URL)	OQ (certificate operations)	Verify PKI workflows correct
Infrastructure migration (GKE cluster, HSM region)	PQ (performance)	Verify performance maintained
Regulatory audit	Full suite (IQ + OQ + PQ)	Comprehensive validation evidence
Security incident	OQ (security tests) + incident-specific tests	Verify mitigations effective

9.5 Evidence Collection

For each test execution, capture:

Test Execution Report (PDF):
- Test date/time
- Tester name
- Environment details (GCP project, cluster, HSM keyring)
- Test results summary (pass/fail counts)
- Individual test case results with evidence references
Test Logs (Archived):
- Console output from test runner
- Application logs during test execution
- HSM operation logs from Cloud KMS
- Network traces (for TLS tests)
Performance Metrics (CSV + Charts):
- Raw latency measurements
- Percentile calculations
- Throughput measurements
- Comparison with baseline
Digital Signature (Detached):
- Test execution report signed by QA lead
- Signature includes timestamp from trusted TSA
- Evidence stored in: gs://coditect-qms-validation/crypto-test-results/YYYY-MM-DD/
Screenshots (for critical operations):
- Cloud KMS console showing created keys
- Certificate chain validation output
- OCSP response for revoked certificate
- Performance dashboard showing benchmark results

10. Test Execution Report Template

CODITECT Biosciences QMS Platform Cryptographic Operations Validation Test Execution Report

Test Execution ID: CRYPTO-TEST-__________ Execution Date: __________ Executed By: __________ Reviewed By: __________ Approved By: __________

Test Environment

Parameter	Value
GCP Project
GKE Cluster
KMS Keyring
Region
Test Tenant
Node.js Version
OpenSSL Version

Test Results Summary

Test Set	Total Tests	Passed	Failed	Pass Rate
NIST KAT Tests	26
Operational Tests	35
Security Tests	10
Performance Tests	15
TOTAL	86

Failed Tests (if any)

Test Case ID	Test Name	Failure Reason	Severity	Mitigation

Performance Results

Test Case	Operation	Target
TC-PERF-001	ECDSA Sign	< 50ms
TC-PERF-002	ECDSA Verify	< 30ms
TC-PERF-003	AES Encrypt (1KB)	< 5ms
TC-PERF-006	HSM Sign	< 100ms
TC-PERF-007	Cert Chain Validation	< 200ms

Compliance Confirmation

All NIST test vectors match exactly (100%)
All weak algorithms rejected (MD5, SHA-1, DES, RSA-1024)
Tampered data detected (GCM auth tag, signature verification)
Certificate chain validation enforced
HSM keys non-exportable
Performance targets met (≥95% of operations)

Evidence Attachments

Test execution logs: evidence/test-logs-YYYY-MM-DD.zip
Performance metrics: evidence/performance-results.csv
NIST vector comparison: evidence/nist-kat-results.json
Screenshots: evidence/screenshots/
Digital signature: evidence/test-report-signature.p7s

Signatures

Role	Signature	Date
Executed By	_________________	________
Reviewed By	_________________	________
Approved By	_________________	________

Digital Signature of This Report: Signed by: __________ Signature File: test-report-signature.p7s Verification Command: openssl smime -verify -in test-report-signature.p7s -CAfile root-ca.pem

11. Appendices

Appendix A: NIST Test Vector Sources

Algorithm	Document	URL
ECDSA P-256	FIPS 186-4, CAVP ECDSA	https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program/digital-signatures
AES-256-GCM	NIST SP 800-38D, CAVP GCM	https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program/block-ciphers
SHA-256	FIPS 180-4, CAVP SHA	https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program/secure-hashing
RSA-2048	FIPS 186-4, CAVP RSA	https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program/digital-signatures
HMAC-SHA256	FIPS 198-1, RFC 4231	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4231

Appendix B: Glossary

Term	Definition
AAD	Additional Authenticated Data - unencrypted data authenticated by GCM mode
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
CAdES	CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (ETSI TS 103 171)
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
DEK	Data Encryption Key (used to encrypt data in envelope encryption)
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (key agreement)
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode (authenticated encryption)
HMAC	Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HSM	Hardware Security Module
IV	Initialization Vector (nonce for AES-GCM)
KAT	Known Answer Test (test with published expected results)
KEK	Key Encryption Key (used to wrap DEKs in envelope encryption)
KMS	Key Management Service (Google Cloud KMS)
LTV	Long-Term Validation (signature with embedded revocation info)
mTLS	Mutual TLS (both client and server authenticate)
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
PEM	Privacy-Enhanced Mail (Base64-encoded certificate format)
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSA padding)
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TSA	Time Stamping Authority

Appendix C: References

NIST FIPS 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
NIST FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
NIST FIPS 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
NIST FIPS 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
NIST FIPS 198-1: The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
NIST SP 800-38D: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2: Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of TLS
NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5: Recommendation for Key Management
RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile
RFC 6960: X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
RFC 6979: Deterministic Usage of DSA and ECDSA
RFC 4231: Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512
ETSI TS 103 171: CAdES Baseline Profile
FDA 21 CFR Part 11: Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures
HIPAA Security Rule: 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart C

END OF DOCUMENT

Document Control:

Prepared by: Claude (Opus 4.6) on behalf of CODITECT Biosciences QMS Security Team
Version: 1.0.0
Classification: Internal - Validation
Next Review: Annual or upon cryptographic system changes

Document Control​

Approval Signatures​

Revision History​

1. Executive Summary​

Purpose​

Scope​

Success Criteria​

2. Test Strategy Overview​

2.1 Test Approach​

2.2 Test Environment Requirements​

Hardware and Services​

Software Prerequisites​

Test Data Requirements​

Configuration​

2.3 Test Execution Phases​

2.4 Evidence Collection​

3. NIST Test Vector Validation​

3.1 ECDSA P-256 (FIPS 186-4)​

TC-NIST-ECDSA-001: Key Pair Generation Validation​

TC-NIST-ECDSA-002: Signature Generation with Known Vector​

TC-NIST-ECDSA-003: Signature Verification with Known Vector​

TC-NIST-ECDSA-004: Invalid Signature Rejection​

TC-NIST-ECDSA-005: Point-Not-On-Curve Rejection​

3.2 AES-256-GCM (NIST SP 800-38D)​

TC-NIST-AES-001: Encryption with Known Vector​

TC-NIST-AES-002: Decryption with Known Vector​

TC-NIST-AES-003: Authentication Tag Verification​

TC-NIST-AES-004: Tampered Ciphertext Detection​

TC-NIST-AES-005: IV Uniqueness Enforcement​

TC-NIST-AES-006: Large Data Encryption (Streaming)​

3.3 SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4)​

TC-NIST-SHA-001: Empty String Hash​

TC-NIST-SHA-002: Single-Block Message Hash​

TC-NIST-SHA-003: Multi-Block Message Hash​

TC-NIST-SHA-004: Large Message Hash (Streaming)​

TC-NIST-SHA-005: Collision Resistance Test​

3.4 RSA-2048 (FIPS 186-4)​

TC-NIST-RSA-001: Key Generation Validation​

TC-NIST-RSA-002: PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation​

TC-NIST-RSA-003: PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification​

TC-NIST-RSA-004: PSS Signature Generation​

TC-NIST-RSA-005: PSS Signature Verification​

TC-NIST-RSA-006: Invalid Key Rejection​

3.5 HMAC-SHA256 (FIPS 198-1)​

TC-NIST-HMAC-001: Known Vector Validation (Short Key)​

TC-NIST-HMAC-002: Known Vector Validation (Long Key)​

TC-NIST-HMAC-003: Variable-Length Data​

TC-NIST-HMAC-004: Truncated MAC Validation​

TC-NIST-HMAC-005: Timing Attack Resistance​

4. Operational Test Cases​

4.1 Key Management Operations​

TC-KM-001: Generate ECDSA P-256 Key Pair via HSM​

TC-KM-002: Generate AES-256 Key via HSM​

TC-KM-003: Key Rotation​

TC-KM-004: Key Revocation​

TC-KM-005: Key Destruction​

TC-KM-006: Key Access Control​

TC-KM-007: Key Export Prevention​

4.2 Envelope Encryption​

TC-EE-001: Encrypt Data with DEK, Wrap DEK with KEK​

TC-EE-002: Decrypt Envelope (Unwrap DEK, Decrypt Data)​

TC-EE-003: KEK Rotation (Old DEKs Still Unwrappable)​

TC-EE-004: Large Data Encryption (100MB)​

TC-EE-005: Concurrent Encryption Operations​

4.3 Digital Signature Operations​

TC-DS-001: Sign Document Hash with User Certificate​

TC-DS-002: Verify Signature with Certificate Chain​

TC-DS-003: Reject Signature from Revoked Certificate​

TC-DS-004: Reject Signature from Expired Certificate​

TC-DS-005: Reject Signature from Wrong Tenant Certificate​

TC-DS-006: Long-Term Validation (LTV) with Embedded OCSP​

TC-DS-007: Concurrent Signature Operations​

4.4 Certificate Operations​

TC-CO-001: Issue User Signing Certificate​

TC-CO-002: Verify Certificate Chain​

TC-CO-003: Revoke Certificate and Verify CRL Update​

TC-CO-004: OCSP Response for Valid Certificate​

TC-CO-005: OCSP Response for Revoked Certificate​

TC-CO-006: Certificate Renewal Before Expiry​

TC-CO-007: Cross-Tenant Certificate Rejection​

Document Control

Approval Signatures

Revision History

1. Executive Summary

Purpose

Scope

Success Criteria

2. Test Strategy Overview

2.1 Test Approach

2.2 Test Environment Requirements

Hardware and Services

Software Prerequisites

Test Data Requirements

Configuration

2.3 Test Execution Phases

2.4 Evidence Collection

3. NIST Test Vector Validation

3.1 ECDSA P-256 (FIPS 186-4)

TC-NIST-ECDSA-001: Key Pair Generation Validation

TC-NIST-ECDSA-002: Signature Generation with Known Vector

TC-NIST-ECDSA-003: Signature Verification with Known Vector

TC-NIST-ECDSA-004: Invalid Signature Rejection

TC-NIST-ECDSA-005: Point-Not-On-Curve Rejection

3.2 AES-256-GCM (NIST SP 800-38D)

TC-NIST-AES-001: Encryption with Known Vector

TC-NIST-AES-002: Decryption with Known Vector

TC-NIST-AES-003: Authentication Tag Verification

TC-NIST-AES-004: Tampered Ciphertext Detection

TC-NIST-AES-005: IV Uniqueness Enforcement

TC-NIST-AES-006: Large Data Encryption (Streaming)

3.3 SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4)

TC-NIST-SHA-001: Empty String Hash

TC-NIST-SHA-002: Single-Block Message Hash

TC-NIST-SHA-003: Multi-Block Message Hash

TC-NIST-SHA-004: Large Message Hash (Streaming)

TC-NIST-SHA-005: Collision Resistance Test

3.4 RSA-2048 (FIPS 186-4)

TC-NIST-RSA-001: Key Generation Validation

TC-NIST-RSA-002: PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation

TC-NIST-RSA-003: PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification

TC-NIST-RSA-004: PSS Signature Generation

TC-NIST-RSA-005: PSS Signature Verification

TC-NIST-RSA-006: Invalid Key Rejection

3.5 HMAC-SHA256 (FIPS 198-1)

TC-NIST-HMAC-001: Known Vector Validation (Short Key)

TC-NIST-HMAC-002: Known Vector Validation (Long Key)

TC-NIST-HMAC-003: Variable-Length Data

TC-NIST-HMAC-004: Truncated MAC Validation

TC-NIST-HMAC-005: Timing Attack Resistance

4. Operational Test Cases

4.1 Key Management Operations

TC-KM-001: Generate ECDSA P-256 Key Pair via HSM

TC-KM-002: Generate AES-256 Key via HSM

TC-KM-003: Key Rotation

TC-KM-004: Key Revocation

TC-KM-005: Key Destruction

TC-KM-006: Key Access Control

TC-KM-007: Key Export Prevention

4.2 Envelope Encryption

TC-EE-001: Encrypt Data with DEK, Wrap DEK with KEK

TC-EE-002: Decrypt Envelope (Unwrap DEK, Decrypt Data)

TC-EE-003: KEK Rotation (Old DEKs Still Unwrappable)

TC-EE-004: Large Data Encryption (100MB)

TC-EE-005: Concurrent Encryption Operations

4.3 Digital Signature Operations

TC-DS-001: Sign Document Hash with User Certificate

TC-DS-002: Verify Signature with Certificate Chain

TC-DS-003: Reject Signature from Revoked Certificate

TC-DS-004: Reject Signature from Expired Certificate

TC-DS-005: Reject Signature from Wrong Tenant Certificate

TC-DS-006: Long-Term Validation (LTV) with Embedded OCSP

TC-DS-007: Concurrent Signature Operations

4.4 Certificate Operations

TC-CO-001: Issue User Signing Certificate

TC-CO-002: Verify Certificate Chain

TC-CO-003: Revoke Certificate and Verify CRL Update

TC-CO-004: OCSP Response for Valid Certificate

TC-CO-005: OCSP Response for Revoked Certificate

TC-CO-006: Certificate Renewal Before Expiry

TC-CO-007: Cross-Tenant Certificate Rejection